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Abstract	
Critical	criminology	must	move	beyond	twentieth‐century	empiricist	and	idealist	paradigms	
because	 the	 concepts	 and	 research	 programmes	 influenced	 by	 these	 paradigms	 are	 falling	
into	obsolescence.	Roger	Matthews’	recent	work	firmly	advocates	this	position	and	helps	to	
set	 the	ball	 rolling.	Here	we	argue	 that	Matthews’	attempt	 to	use	critical	 realist	 thought	 to	
move	Left	Realism	towards	an	advanced	position	can	help	to	put	criminology	on	a	sound	new	
footing.	 However,	 before	 this	 becomes	 possible	 numerous	 philosophical	 and	 theoretical	
issues	 must	 be	 ironed	 out.	 Most	 importantly,	 critical	 criminology	 must	 avoid	 political	
pragmatism	 and	 adopt	 a	 more	 critical	 stance	 towards	 consumer	 culture’s	 spectacle.	 A	
searching	 analysis	 of	 these	 issues	 suggests	 that,	 ultimately,	 criminology	 is	 weighed	 down	
with	obsolete	thinking	to	such	an	extent	that	to	remain	intellectually	relevant	it	must	move	
beyond	both	Left	Realism	and	Critical	Realism	to	construct	a	new	ultra‐realist	position.	
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Introduction	
As	one	of	 the	original	 architects	 of	Left	Realism,	Roger	Matthews	 is	 too	well‐known	 for	us	 to	
have	 to	 outline	 his	 many	 achievements	 and	 his	 influence	 on	 the	 discipline.	 We	 assume	 that	
readers	of	this	special	issue	know	his	work	quite	well.	Instead	of	doffing	our	caps	and	writing	an	
anodyne	 and	 congratulatory	 review,	we	want	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 claims	Matthews	makes	 in	 this	
book	and	what	can	be	drawn	from	them	to	drive	our	discipline	forward.	This	is,	after	all,	how	
one	treats	an	intellectual	with	respect:	not	by	withholding	critical	 judgement	and	genuflecting	
politely	 but	 by	 taking	 the	 broad	 realist	 position	 he	 represents	 seriously	 and,	 in	 the	 act	 of	
criticising	it,	working	to	keeping	it	alive	and	operational.		
	
In	order	to	contextualise	Matthews’	book	we	must	first	say	a	few	words	about	the	condition	of	
contemporary	 criminology.	 For	 us,	 theoretical	 criminology	 has	 almost	 ground	 to	 a	 complete	
standstill.	There	have	been	a	few	interesting	contributions	to	existing	positions	in	recent	years	
but	 the	 general	 trend	 is	 quite	 clear.	 Criminologists	 these	 days	 seem	 doomed	 to	 repeat	 ideas	
from	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 perhaps	 with	 an	 occasional	 slight	 adjustment	 suggesting	
‘originality’	and	forward	motion,	and	there	appears	to	be	a	pronounced	fear	of	actually	hatching	
new	 ideas	 and	 positions	 that	 are	 products	 of	 a	 thoroughgoing	 critical	 interrogation	 of	 our	
present	 conjuncture.	 Our	 withdrawal	 from	 theory‐building	 has	 left	 the	 door	 open	 for	 banal	
empiricism	to	wander	in	unopposed	and	make	itself	at	home.	As	Matthews	(2010)	himself	has	
hinted,	 huge	 swathes	 of	 our	 discipline	 are	 now	 occupied	 by	 fact‐finding	 or	 story‐telling	
empiricists	who	 appear	more	 interested	 in	 career‐building,	 income‐generation	 and	 supplying	
various	political	and	cultural	interest	groups	with	ideological	ammunition	than	they	are	in	the	
pursuit	of	truth.		
	
Criminologists	have	largely	failed	to	take	a	lead	in	explaining	and	solving	the	crucial	problems	
we	 face	 today.	These	problems	are	 too	numerous	 to	recount	 in	 full	detail	here,	but	 for	us	 the	
most	 notable	 are	 the	 imminent	 threat	 of	 ecological	 catastrophe,	 the	 power	 of	 global	 capital	
constantly	 to	 disrupt	 the	 ethical	 and	 socioeconomic	 lives	 of	 everyday	 people,	 the	 growth	 of	
global	 criminal	 markets	 that	 operate	 off	 the	 statistical	 radar,	 and	 the	 growth	 of	 the	
securitisation	 apparatus.	 Entrapment	 in	 this	 totalising	market	 system	 is	 persuading	 so	many	
people	at	some	difficult	point	in	their	lives	to	simply	give	up	on	the	principles	of	trusting	others	
and	doing	honest	business	(see	Antonopoulos	and	Hall	2014;	Winlow	2014).	We	seem	unable	to	
even	properly	tax	the	super‐rich,	let	alone	ensure	economic	participation	for	all	or	redistribute	
power	 and	 wealth.	 We	 have	 also	 seen	 the	 implosion	 of	 state	 governance	 in	 some	 locales	
(Grayson	 2011;	 Mattei	 and	 Nader	 2008;	 Silverstein	 2014;	 see	 also	 Currie	 2013),	 and	 the	
withering	away	of	progressive	sociability	in	a	great	many	more	(Winlow	and	Hall	2013).		
	
The	 harms	 that	 result	 from	 these	 combined	 processes	 are	 staggering	 to	 behold,	 but	 critical	
criminology	has	not	yet	managed	to	bring	them	into	relief	because	it	remains	firmly	rooted	in	
social	 constructionism	 and	 its	 interminable	 relativistic	 analyses	 of	 ethics,	 language	 and	
epistemology.	 For	 many	 critical	 criminologists	 the	 default	 position	 continues	 to	 involve	 the	
dismissal	 of	 harm	 and	 the	 redirection	 of	 critical	 attention	 towards	 government	 and	 the	
oligarchs	 who	 control	 the	 mass	 media.	 Despite	 the	 sheer	 scale	 of	 the	 2008	 crash	 and	 the	
ongoing	 harms	 of	 ‘austerity’,	 twenty‐first	 century	 critical	 criminology	 is,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	
resolutely	idealist	and	it	cannot	be	persuaded	to	look	again	at	the	reality	of	our	present	way	of	
life.	We	remain	trapped	in	an	epoch	defined	by	the	collapse	and	partial	resurgence	of	abstract	
finance	capitalism,	a	system	which,	we	all	know,	redistributes	wealth	upwards,	destroys	welfare	
systems,	corrupts	democracy	and	casts	growing	numbers	 into	debt	peonage.	The	 free	hand	of	
the	 market	 has	 created	 utter	 devastation	 in	 our	 physical	 and	 social	 environments	 but	 still	
processes	 of	 ‘labelling’,	 ‘stigmatisation’	 and	 ‘othering’	 preoccupy	 the	 criminological	 Left.	 The	
Leftist	tradition	of	ideology	critique	is	noticeable	only	by	its	absence,	and	there	is	little	obvious	
desire	to	develop	a	new	critical	focus	on	global	political	economy	and	its	deleterious	outcomes	
(Sayer	2015).	We	are	generalising	of	course,	but	it	makes	no	sense	to	deny	critical	criminology’s	
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continued	 idealism	and	content	ourselves	with	 the	conceit	 that	we	are	doing	a	 sterling	 job	of	
identifying	and	explaining	the	social	harms	that	are	inevitable	outcomes	of	the	financialisation	
of	 the	 global	 economy,	 the	 corruption	 of	 our	 politics	 and	 the	 gradual	 corrosion	 of	 our	 social	
worlds.	
	
Matthews’	book	seeks	to	respond	to	the	general	inertia	of	the	discipline.	In	particular	he	hopes	
to	move	 beyond	 the	 reductive	 and	 non‐dialectical	 interplay	 between	 critical	 criminology	 and	
administrative	criminology.	For	Matthews,	there	are	productive	seams	still	to	be	mined	and,	if	
criminology	 is	 to	 progress,	 it	 needs	 to	move	 beyond	 the	 idealism	 of	 the	 Left	 and	 the	 cynical	
pragmatism	of	the	Right	by	working	through	the	new	realist	agenda	he	outlines	in	the	book.	The	
general	 framework	 he	 offers	 us	 owes	 much	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 Left	 Realism,	 but	 the	 most	
important	influence	on	Matthews’	thesis	is	the	Critical	Realism	of	Roy	Bhaskar	(2008a,	2008b),	
Margaret	Archer	 (2004)	 and	 others.	Matthews	 is	 one	 of	 the	 first	 criminologists	 to	 utilise	 this	
considerable	body	of	theory.	As	a	resolutely	empirical	discipline	Anglo‐European	social	science	
has	 scorned	 abstract	 theoretical	models,	 especially	 those	 which	 seek	 to	 identify	 and	 grapple	
with	 intransitive	 forces	 that	 operate	 underneath	 language	 and	 interpretation.	 The	 refusal	 to	
engage	 with	 such	 models	 is	 a	 great	 shame	 because	 Bhaskar	 had	 much	 to	 teach	 us	 about	
everyday	experience	and	its	underlying	contexts.		
	
Matthews	does	not	talk	in	detail	about	Critical	Realism,	and	he	does	not	clearly	identify	which	
aspects	of	this	quite	substantial	corpus	are	vital	for	the	rejuvenation	of	our	discipline.	Instead	he	
spends	 a	 significant	 portion	 of	 the	 book	 identifying	 the	 obvious	 limitations	 of	 insubstantial	
liberalism	 and	 its	 damaging	 effects	 on	 criminology.	 Matthews	 pulls	 no	 punches.	 He	 is	 brave	
enough	to	acknowledge	that	the	anti‐statist	liberalism	and	libertarianism	that	is	so	common	on	
criminology’s	 Left‐wing	 shares	 a	 common	 ideological	 root	 with	 the	 anti‐regulatory	
neoliberalism	that	has	become	totally	dominant	on	the	political	Right.	He	begins	the	book	with	
an	 authoritative	 account	 of	 the	 development	 of	 modern	 criminology,	 which	 is	 all	 the	 more	
absorbing	given	that	Matthews	himself	played	a	significant	role	in	fracturing	the	criminological	
Left	during	 the	1980s.	Alongside	a	number	of	 colleagues	(see	especially	Lea	and	Young	1993;	
Matthews	and	Young	1986),	he	could	no	longer	tolerate	the	naïve	idealism,	crude	structuralism	
and	political	 inefficacy	of	 the	radical	social	constructionism	that	had	colonised	Leftist	 thought	
and	 politics.	 He	 proposed	 to	 build	 an	 innovative	 Leftist	 account	 of	 the	 crime	 problem	 that,	
without	 diminishing	 the	 disproportionate	 harms	 caused	 by	 state	 and	 corporate	 crime,	
acknowledged	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 genuine	 harms	 that	 working	 class	 and	 minority	 criminality	
could	inflict	on	victims.		
	
What	Matthews	attempts	to	do	here	is	reconstruct	Left	Realism	on	a	solid	new	epistemological	
foundation.	 In	 truth	 the	British	Left	Realism	of	 the	1980s	couldn’t	quite	 tear	 itself	 away	 from	
hard‐line	 social	 constructionism	 and	 diluted	 cultural	Marxism.	 Jock	 Young	 (2009),	Matthews’	
sometime	collaborator,	 remained	wedded	 to	moral	panic	 theory,	 a	 favourite	concept	amongst	
the	 social	 constructionists,	 despite	 having	 earlier	 expressed	 concern	 that	 it	 was	 being	
overstated.	In	his	later	role	as	a	cultural	criminologist,	Young	tended	to	assume	with	the	others	
influenced	by	the	cultural	Marxism	of	EP	Thompson	and	Stuart	Hall	(see	Dworkin	1997;	Winlow	
et	al.	2015)	that	resistance	to	power	was	a	 timeless	 fact	of	 life	and	an	inexhaustible	source	of	
political	 energy.	Others	 in	 the	 cultural	 criminology	 fold	are	now	beginning	 to	express	 serious	
doubts	about	the	symbolic	efficiency	of	the	concept	of	organic	resistance,	but	it	still	holds	on	to	
its	place	as	one	of	the	sub‐discipline’s	fundamental	domain	assumptions.	
	
Critical	Realism	offers	a	far	more	solid	and	dependable	intellectual	base	from	which	to	proceed.	
Much	of	Matthews’	book	is	pitched	as	a	critique	of	contemporary	criminology,	and	he	should	be	
warmly	 congratulated	 for	 slaughtering	 a	 few	 of	 criminology’s	 sacred	 cows	 with	 surgical	
precision.	He	believes	that	realist	criminology	must	be	policy	relevant,	avoid	the	 idealism	of	a	
radical	Left	that	 lost	 its	way	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	as	 it	was	absorbed	by	the	powerful	anti‐
statist	 liberal	 and	 libertarian	 currents	 that	 became	 dominant	 at	 the	 time,	 and	 progress	
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incrementally	by	producing	new	theoretical	insights	and	empirical	data.	We	support	the	overall	
principle	 of	moving	 forward,	 especially	 the	 need	 for	 criminology’s	 internal	 production	 –	 and	
indeed	importation	from	external	disciplines	such	as	philosophy	–	of	new	theoretical	concepts	
that	can	help	to	explain	the	criminological	phenomena	that	appear	in	today’s	world.	However,	
we	 have	 a	 number	 of	 problems	 with	 the	 way	 he	 wants	 to	 initiate	 this	 new	 and	 crucial	
progressive	 movement	 in	 criminological	 thought.	 Firstly,	 we	 have	 a	 problem	 with	 his	
conceptualisation	 of	 both	 ‘realism’	 and	 ‘idealism’.	 Secondly	 –	 and	 this	 follows	 on	 from	 the	
problem	of	defining	realism	–	we	fundamentally	disagree	with	the	emphasis	Matthews’	places	
upon	‘policy	relevance’.	Thirdly,	we	are	not	convinced	that	empiricism	can	perform	the	leading	
role	 that	 he	 envisages.	 Fourthly,	 his	 defence	 of	 ‘consumerism’	 rests	 on	 a	 failure	 to	make	 the	
crucial	 distinction	 between	 consumption	 and	 consumer	 culture	 (see	 Hall	 et	 al.	 2008),	 a	 fatal	
move	that	kills	off	the	possibility	of	constructing	a	new	realist	criminology	that	can	effectively	
criticise	and	suggest	alternatives	to	the	destructive	and	criminogenic	way	of	life	we	lead	today.	
	
Left	Realism	–	initial	problems	
Fraser	 (2013)	 argues	 that	 feminism	 had	 lost	 much	 of	 its	 radical	 appeal	 by	 the	 turn	 of	 the	
millennium	 and	 was	 all	 too	 easily	 assimilated	 by	 neoliberalism’s	 competitive‐individualist	
culture.	However,	 feminism’s	 initial	 impact	 on	 criminology	was	nevertheless	 a	 game‐changer.	
By	 emphasising	 the	 important	 point	 that	 some	 crime	 represents	 an	 experience	 of	 real	 harm	
lived	 by	 human	 beings	 and	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 social	 construct	 exaggerated	 by	 the	 media	 for	
political	 purposes,	 feminist	 criminologists	 performed	 the	 valuable	 task	 of	 returning	 Leftist	
criminology’s	 objects	 of	 crime	 and	 harm	 to	 the	 foreground	 and	 reconnecting	 them	 to	
experiential	reality.		
	
The	emergence	of	Left	Realism	in	Britain	in	the	mid‐1980s	was	a	culmination	of	critical	thinking	
about	the	inherent	flaws	of	Left	Idealism	and	other	mainstream	criminological	theories.	Currie’s	
(1985)	and	Young’s	(1986)	early	contributions	were	seminal.	However,	although	Left	Idealism’s	
most	 prominent	 flaw	 was	 the	 neglect	 of	 the	 reality	 of	 crime	 as	 experienced	 by	 victims,	 the	
emergence	of	Left	Realism	also	appears	to	have	been,	at	least	partially,	a	reaction	to	the	success	
Right‐realist	criminology	had	achieved	in	its	 lobbying	of	the	US	and	UK	governments	from	the	
1970s.	Right	realists	had	always	focused	on	victims,	but	it	was	a	superficial	populist	focus	that	
completely	 failed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful	 or	 analyse	 the	 complex	
conditions	that	underlie	trends	in	crime	and	harm	(Hall	and	Wilson	2014).	Whilst	Left	realists	
still	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 crimes	 of	 the	 powerful	 were	 not	 properly	 addressed	 and	 some	
aspects	of	 law	and	 criminal	 justice	were	biased	against	 the	working	 class,	 they	 admitted	 that	
most	 petty	 crime	was	 intra‐class.	 In	 other	words	most	 of	 it	was	 committed	 by	working‐class	
people	against	other	working‐class	people	(see	Schwartz	and	DeKeseredy	1991).	
	
These	were	the	salutary	lessons	provided	by	the	US	and	UK	victim	surveys	of	the	1980s.	Even	
the	partial	glimpse	of	reality	provided	by	orthodox	empiricism	revealed	the	flaws	of	Left‐idealist	
critical	criminology.	Critical	criminology’s	weak	theorisation	of	intra‐class	crime	and	absence	of	
suggestions	for	policy	allowed	Right	Realism	to	dominate.	Left	Realism	attempted	to	correct	this	
problem	 by	 constructing	 a	 more	 realistic	 theory	 of	 crime	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 harms	 victims	
experience	 in	 their	 locales	 and	 analysing	 them	 in	 the	 ‘square	 of	 crime’	 (see	 for	 example	 Lea	
1987,	1992).	This	new	theoretical	framework	was	made	up	of	four	interactive	relational	parts:	
the	 victim,	 the	 offender,	 the	 reaction	 of	 the	 public	 and	 the	 reaction	 of	 the	 state’s	 agencies.	 If	
fractious	relations	between	these	 four	major	players	could	be	 improved,	 it	may	be	possible	 to	
reduce	crime	without	increased	securitisation.		
	
In	the	1990s	Left	Realism	appears	to	have	a	small	amount	of	influence	on	the	Blair	and	Clinton	
governments.	 However,	 repairing	 relations	 in	 the	 square	 of	 crime	 did	 little	 to	 alleviate	 the	
underlying	 economic	 and	 cultural	 conditions	 which	 seemed	 to	 have	 probabilistic	 causal	
relationships	 to	 crime	 and	 harm.	 Left	 Realism	 challenged	 the	 domination	 of	 social	
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constructionism	on	 the	 Left	 and	 called	 for	 positive	 policy	 interventions,	 but	 not	 at	 the	 depth	
required	to	impact	upon	 late	capitalism’s	underlying	criminogenic	conditions.	As	we	all	know,	
eventually	the	Right	won	the	argument	with	their	securitisation	and	incarceration	agendas.	
	
Despite	 this	 failure,	Matthews	argues	 that	criminology	should	build	on	Left	Realism’s	positive	
gains	by	 incorporating	Critical	Realism.	We	agree	with	 this,	 but	 the	 fundamental	problem	we	
have	is	that	Matthews	gets	this	project	off	on	the	wrong	footing	by	inverting	the	concepts	of	the	
‘real’	and	the	‘ideal’.	He	posits	depth	intervention	as	a	form	of	‘idealism’,	but	he	understands	this	
not	 as	 philosophical	 or	 ethical	 idealism	 but	 impossible	 utopianism.	 He	 then	 insists	 that	 we	
should	restrict	ourselves	to	‘realism’,	but	in	reality	he	understands	this	‘realism’	to	be	a	form	of	
pragmatism,	 in	 this	 case	 piecemeal	 policy	 reforms	 in	 the	 context	 of	 liberal‐parliamentary	
capitalism.	Matthews’	 argument	 therefore	 rests	on	 two	 fundamental	 category	 errors	made	by	
confusing	idealism	with	utopianism	and	realism	with	pragmatism.		
	
This	categorical	shift	allows	Matthews	to	avoid	the	fundamental	political	question	at	the	heart	of	
realist	 criminology:	what	depth	of	political	 intervention	 is	 required	 to	 create	 the	 conditions	 in	
which	harmful	crime	can	be	significantly	reduced	without	reliance	on	securitisation?	Matthews	
has	 pre‐empted	 this	 fundamental	 question,	 moving	 us	 further	 away	 from	 genuine	 Critical	
Realism	and	closer	to	the	administrative	pragmatism	that	eventually	ground	Left	Realism	to	a	
halt	as	an	intellectual	project.	
	
We	cannot	begin	to	speak	about	the	amelioration	of	harms	without	a	realistic	appraisal	of	our	
current	situation	and	the	forces	and	processes	that	underlie	it.	Although	some	Left	realists	still	
write	with	 critical	 depth	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Lea	 2002),	 the	 Left	 realist	movement	 as	 a	whole	
faltered	as	it	moved	forward	into	the	1990s	and	became	something	of	a	compromise	between	
critical	criminology	and	administrative	criminology.	It	became	progressively	bogged	down	in	its	
administrative	 role	 of	 providing	 neoliberal	 governments	 with	 pragmatic	 alternatives	 to	 the	
Right	 realist	 strategies	of	 securitisation	 and	 incarceration,	 an	unwinnable	 game	played	out	 in	
front	 of	 a	 public	 who	 wanted	 quick	 results.	 Even	 gestures	 towards	 long‐term	 projects	 of	
transforming	 underlying	 structures	 and	 processes	 became	 potentially	 discrediting	 to	 a	 Left	
Realism	committed	to	pragmatism;	it	had	made	its	bed	and	had	to	lie	on	it.	
	
An	injection	of	genuine	Critical	Realism	could	have	revived	Left	Realism.	The	principle	that	deep	
political	 intervention	was	impossible	had	already	been	established	(see	Lea	and	Young	1993),	
and	 Left	 Realism	 became	 ensnared	 by	 the	 negative	 ideology	 of	 capitalist	 realism	 (see	 Fisher	
2009),	 the	 new	 liberal‐postmodernist	 ideology	 that	 has	 convinced	 the	 vast	 majority	 that	 no	
fundamental	alternative	to	capitalism	is	feasible.	The	triumph	of	capitalist	realism	has	been	so	
complete	 that	 even	 traditional	 social	 democratic	 reforms	 –	 such	 as	 publicly	 controlled	
investment,	 progressive	 taxation,	 nationalised	 major	 industries,	 state‐run	 health	 and	 secular	
education	–	now	appear	extreme	and	remote	from	the	reality	in	which	we	live	(Winlow	and	Hall	
2013).	 Left	 Realism’s	 pragmatism	 also	 left	 it	 with	 little	 choice	 but	 to	 adopt	 standard	 legal	
definitions	of	crime,	which	of	course	ignore	broader	and	deeper	harms.	Thus	it	contributed	little	
to	the	debate	on	whether	the	legal	categories	of	 ‘crime’	properly	represent	the	harms	inflicted	
on	ordinary	people	and	 their	 environments.	Because	major	 structural	 and	 systemic	problems	
remained	beyond	its	scope	it	had	little	to	say	about	reform	beyond	criminal	justice	agencies	and	
local	communities.	Left	Realism	boxed	itself	into	a	corner	because	it	inappropriately	redefined	
realism	as	the	pragmatism	that	limits	itself	to	what	can	be	done	within	existing	structural	and	
systemic	 restraints.	 Simultaneously,	 by	 confusing	 true	 realism	 with	 impossible	 idealism,	 it	
severely	 narrowed	 its	 analytical	 scope	 and	 became	 unable	 to	 address	 what	must	 be	 done	 to	
transform	underlying	criminogenic	conditions.	
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Problems	with	empiricism	
Matthews’	 blueprint	 for	 a	 new	 realism	 relies	 on	 an	 empirical	 platform.	 While	 it	 is	 unfair	 to	
portray	 empiricism	 as	 intrinsically	 useless,	 on	 its	 own,	without	 the	 guidance	 of	 sophisticated	
theoretical	concepts	relevant	to	the	times	in	which	we	live,	it	can	be	intellectually	and	politically	
toxic.	Constantly	affirming	obsolete	concepts	 is	on	balance	worse	than	knowing	nothing	at	all.	
Without	relevant	concepts	empiricism	is	too	easily	deployed	in	the	task	of	reproducing	rather	
than	transforming	current	conditions.	Hypothetically,	the	task	of	empirically	testing	broad,	deep	
and	 sophisticated	 theories	 is	 not	 impossible,	 but	 in	 practical	 terms	 it	 is	 either	 too	 expensive,	
impractical	 or	 politically	 impossible.	 Whereas	 extreme	 social	 constructionism	 promotes	
political	inertia	by	obscuring	reality	and	transforming	the	vital	task	of	conceptualisation	into	an	
endless	language	game,	post‐structuralism	insists	that	meaning	is	always	contingent	and	reality	
can	 never	 really	 be	 represented,	 except	 perhaps	 for	 the	 shortest	 time	 in	 the	 most	 localised	
space.	Matthews	 is	 right	 to	 reject	 this	 obfuscation,	 but	 the	 expensive	 and	unwieldy	 empirical	
method	is	not	necessarily	the	most	reliable	way	forward.	
	
All	 empirical	projects	 are	 subject	 to	prior	political	 agendas.	 ‘Value‐free’	 empirical	 science	 is	 a	
myth,	and	criminology’s	research	agenda	 is	 inextricably	tied	to	existing	political	positions,	 the	
domain	assumptions	of	which	 insist	 that	we	accept	 their	various	beliefs	about	human	nature,	
morality,	freedom,	authority,	harm	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	our	lives	(Hall	and	Winlow	2015).	
What	 should	be	more	 interesting	 to	 social	 scientists,	 however,	 are	 the	 repressed	 experiences	
and	views	of	Baudrillard’s	(2007)	‘silent	majority’,	those	who	have	little	or	no	representation	or	
influence	 upon	 current	 political	 agendas.	 The	 experiences	 of	 the	 ‘silent	majority’	 are	 filtered	
through	dominant	ideologies	and	either	denied	clear	symbolic	expression	by	constructionists	or	
always	fragmented	and	misrepresented	by	empiricists.	Empiricism	is	an	ideological	mercenary	
that	can	serve	any	political	purpose	and,	thus,	on	its	own,	without	a	thorough	and	sophisticated	
re‐conceptualisation	of	the	experiences	and	underlying	contexts	of	everyday	life,	cannot	provide	
the	platform	for	a	new	criminological	realism.	
	
In	the	absence	of	the	will	to	re‐conceptualise	everyday	experiential	life	and	its	contexts	through	
the	 lenses	 of	 both	minorities	 and	 the	 silent	majority,	 the	open	debate	on	precisely	 how	deep	
reforms	must	 go	 and	which	 reforms	 are	 likely	 to	have	 any	 significant	 and	durable	 impact	 on	
criminality,	 harm	 and	 securitisation,	 which	 should	 be	 the	 epicentre	 of	 social	 science,	 is	
impossible.	This	is	the	task	of	theoretical	criminology,	but	it	 is	now	perfectly	clear	that	theory	
has	 been	 marginalised	 in	 the	 discipline.	 To	 begin	 the	 task	 of	 reconceptualisation	 theoretical	
criminology	must	first	recognise	our	current	representations	and	models	of	the	social	world	–	
with	its	phenomena,	events,	values,	norms	and	power	relations	–	as	effects	rather	than	causes.	
Causes	operate	in	far	deeper	and	very	complex	processes	organised	by	the	fundamental	fantasy	
that	 drives	 the	 subjective	 agent	 and	 the	 fundamental	 logic	 that	 drives	 and	 organises	 the	
interactions	between	the	psyche,	culture	and	the	socioeconomic	system.		
	
Matthews	also	has	difficulty	in	recognising	the	unavoidable	fact	that	by	far	the	most	influential	
context	 for	 the	 configuration	 and	 reproduction	 of	 the	 fundamental	 fantasy,	 and	 by	 extension	
late‐capitalist	subjectivity,	is	consumer	culture	(Hall	et	al.	2008;	Miles	2014;	Moxon	2011;	Smart	
2010).	 He	 refuses	 to	 accept	 the	 incorporation	 of	 the	 silent	 majority	 into	 the	 subjectivising	
symbolic	 circuits	 of	 consumer	 culture	 and	 the	 permanent	 distraction	 of	 potential	 political	
energy.	 In	 contemporary	 consumer	 culture	 the	majority	 seek	 their	 status	 and	 construct	 their	
identities,	 yet	 this	 is	 consistently	 denied	 by	 those	 on	 the	 Left	 who	 hang	 onto	 obsolete	
conceptions	of	 ‘autonomous’	 subjectivity.	Matthews	 (2014)	 goes	one	 step	 further	by	 claiming	
that	 ‘consumerism’	 is	 one	 of	 capitalism’s	 great	 benefits,	 the	 saving	 grace	 of	 an	 otherwise	
oppressive	 socioeconomic	 system.	 According	 to	 Matthews,	 when	 capitalism	 is	 one	 day	
transformed	 by	 accumulated	 pragmatic	 reforms,	 consumerism	 should	 take	 its	 place	 as	 a	
fundamental	right,	a	great	gift	to	the	people.		
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This	is	populist	rhetoric	born	a	fundamental	misunderstanding	of	what	consumer	culture	is	and	
what	it	has	done	to	human	relations	and	processes	of	 identity	formation	(see	Hayward	2012).	
As	 such	 it	 is	 the	 weakest	 aspect	 of	 Matthews’	 overall	 argument.	 Matthews	 confuses	
consumption	with	consumerism,	and	he	 then	continues	on	down	this	 intellectual	dead‐end	 to	
make	a	 series	of	quite	 significant	mistakes	 that	detract	 from	 the	more	edifying	 aspects	of	 the	
book.	 Matthews	 sees	 only	 good	 things	 in	 consumerism.	 He	 can	 see	 no	 problem	 in	 the	 way	
consumer	 culture	 stimulates	 myriad	 false	 needs,	 its	 tendency	 to	 make	 individuals	 feel	
inadequate	 or	 incomplete,	 and	 its	 role	 in	 mediating	 social	 relationships	 and	 driving	 new	
exclusions	and	 forms	of	 discrimination	 (see,	 for	 example,	Hayward	and	Yar	2006).	He	has	no	
issue	with	the	vacuity	of	commodified	forms	of	culture	that	exist	solely	to	sell,	or	with	consumer	
symbolism’s	role	in	the	depoliticisation	of	the	working	class	and	the	displacement	and	erosion	
of	the	collective	identity‐building	once	sourced	in	class,	community,	locality,	family	and	history.	
The	 inability	 to	 distinguish	 between	 consumption	 and	 consumerism	 also	 hampers	 our	
understanding	of	important	changes	within	the	capitalism	economic	system	itself,	most	notably	
western	 de‐industrialisation	 and	 the	 growth	 of	 new	 eastern	 industrial	 economies	 built	 upon	
production	 for	 export	 to	a	west	now	populated	by	debt‐laden	consumers	 (Horsley	2015).	His	
idealistic	pragmatism	and	faith	 in	the	benefits	of	consumerism	must	come	as	cold	comfort	 for	
those	 workers	 forced	 to	 toil	 in	 appalling	 conditions	 in	 sweatshops	 across	 the	 east.	 The	
appearance	 of	 a	 global	 precariat	 in	 mega‐slums	 serviced	 by	 failed	 states	 (Davis	 2007),	 the	
degradation	of	our	eco‐system	and	the	depletion	of	our	natural	resources	(Heinberg	2011;	Klare	
2008,	 2012),	 impending	 resource	 wars	 and	 enforced	 population	 movements	 (Klare	 2002),	
burgeoning	 criminal	 markets	 in	 cyber‐space	 (Treadwell	 2012)	 and	 the	 other	 problems	 that	
await	 future	 generations	 simply	 do	 not	 appear	 on	 the	 radar	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 ‘realist’	 project	
Matthews	advocates.		
	
Why	we	need	Ultra‐Realism	
At	 the	 moment,	 liberal‐Left	 sociology	 and	 criminology	 are	 limited	 to	 the	 study	 of	 effects	 or	
symptoms	as	either	constructions	or	mid‐range	causes	rather	than	indicators	of	what	might	lie	
beneath	them.	Matthews	is	right	that	the	only	way	to	get	down	to	causes	is	a	potentially	potent	
realist	project.	However,	 even	 the	brief	 critiques	presented	here	 suggest	 that	 the	pragmatism	
and	 empiricism	 he	 advocates	 –	 especially	 in	 a	 context	 shorn	 of	 the	 most	 important	 cultural	
current	in	late	modernity	–	are	not	nearly	strong	enough	as	a	platform	on	which	such	a	project	
can	be	built.	
	
For	us,	if	such	a	platform	is	to	be	built	it	is	first	necessary	to	restart	the	theoretical	machinery	
that	was	 shut	 down	by	 both	mainstream	 and	 critical	 criminology	 in	 the	post‐war	period.	We	
would	 contend	 that	 Matthews’	 ambition	 of	 a	 new	 critical	 realist	 criminology	 can	 come	 to	
fruition	 only	 in	 a	 framework	 of	 what	 we	 call	 Ultra‐Realism	 (see	 Hall	 and	 Winlow	 2015).	
Empiricist	 criminology	 is	 trapped	 in	 the	 superficial	 realm	 of	 phenomena	 and,	 along	 with	
interpretivists	 and	 post‐structuralists,	 its	 advocates	 tend	 to	 discourage	 theorisation	 of	 depth	
structures	 and	 generative	 processes.	One	 further	 problem	 is	 that	 it	 cannot	 provide	us	with	 a	
sense	of	absence,	which,	as	we	shall	see	shortly,	is	also	causative	at	the	deep	level.		
	
However,	 anyone	 who	 advocates	 a	 return	 to	 realism	 has	 to	 contend	 with	 the	 problem	 that	
realism	in	general	has	a	rather	bad	name.	One	reason	behind	this	is	the	dominance	of	varieties	
of	 cynical	 realism	 in	popular	 culture,	 politics,	 philosophy	and	 social	 sciences.	These	positions	
transhistoricise	and	essentialise	the	very	worst	of	human	propensities	and	tacitly	support	 the	
politics	 of	 conservatism	 and	 classical	 liberalism.	 Their	 cynicism	 and	 essentialism	 is	 such	 that	
they	make	 socioeconomic	 transformation	 look	 either	 unwise	 or	 impossible.	 Conservativism’s	
rigid,	pessimistic	Old	Testament	 view	of	 the	human	being	as	 an	 intrinsically	wicked	 sinner	 is	
often	given	pseudo‐scientific	credibility	by	the	ethological	conception	of	the	human	as	a	 ‘killer	
ape’	 (Dart	 1953).	 The	 timeless	 sinner	 is	 in	 need	 of	 constant	 discipline	 and	 punishment	 by	
traditional	 institutions	 bolstered	 by	 the	 rational‐technological	 forces	 of	 modernity.	 Most	
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conservative	control	theories	are	grounded	in	this	myth,	and	neoclassical	Right	Realism	differs	
only	 in	 its	 myth	 of	 the	 wicked	 human	 being	 as	 a	 rational	 calculating	 individual	 able	 to	 be	
deterred	and	pressured	into	a	mode	of	self‐government	by	external	systems	of	punishment.		
	
Liberal‐postmodernism	has	its	own	version	of	cynical	realism.	In	art,	cinema,	literature,	music	
and	many	forms	of	youth	culture	on	the	‘street’	we	can	detect	the	powerful	current	of	depressive	
realism.	Well‐known	 examples	 include	 the	 works	 of	 French	 novelist	 Michel	 Houellebecq	 and	
American	 novelist	 Brett	 Easton‐Ellis	 (Jeffery	 2011).	 Redolent	 of	 capitalist	 realism,	 which	
systematically	persuades	 young	people	 that	 no	 change	 is	 possible	 in	 their	 lifetime,	depressive	
realism	supplies	us	with	a	narrative	of	late‐modern	degeneration	–	selfishness,	nihilism	and	the	
futility	and	exhaustion	of	life	at	the	dystopian	end	of	history	(Jeffery	2011).	It’s	rather	sobering	
that	 all	 the	 Left	 can	 place	 in	 opposition	 to	 this	 edifice	 of	 conservative	 and	 postmodernist	
cynicism	 is	 the	 rather	 ailing	 Left	 Idealism	 of	 the	 60s‐vintage	 ‘New	 Left’.	 Left	 Idealism	 was	
Young’s	 (1975)	 term	 for	 this	 influential	 movement,	 but	 it	 is	 a	 misnomer.	 Underneath	 the	
idealism	 represented	 in	 symbolic	 interplay	 lies	 a	 disavowed	 naturalistic	 realism,	 the	 naïve	
assumption	 that	 the	 human	 being	 is	 always	 orientated	 to	 creativity,	 transgression	 and	 the	
struggle	 for	 social	 justice,	 the	mirror	 image	 of	 conservatism’s	wickedness,	 the	 opposing	 view	
that	can	be	allowed	into	liberalism’s	intellectual	clearing	house	for	the	sake	of	balance	and	the	
perpetuation	of	eternal	hope	amidst	permanent	political	inaction.	Both	positions	are	unable	to	
deal	with	the	sheer	diversity	of	human	drives,	desires	and	actions.	
	
Critical	 Realism,	 as	 Matthews	 points	 out,	 presents	 criminology	 with	 a	 genuinely	 alternative	
theoretical	framework.	Most	critical	realists	claim	that	some	measured	empirical	observation	is	
useful,	as	is	the	acknowledgement	of	human	meaning	and	the	causal	power	of	agency,	but	they	
stress	 that	 there	 is	 far	more	 to	 social	 life	 and	 its	 dynamic	 relations	 and	 forces.	 Roy	 Bhaskar	
(2008a),	 Critical	 Realism’s	 main	 architect,	 argued	 that	 positivism‐empiricism	 can	 reveal	 the	
regular	 recurrence	 of	 events	 but	 not	 the	 underlying	 structures,	 powers,	 forces	 and	processes	
that	 influence	 the	 way	 events	 occur.	 These	 deep	 dynamics	 are	 never	 fully	 revealed	 or	
represented	by	empirically	observable	events.	This	is	especially	true	in	the	criminological	field,	
where	 the	 systematic	 concealment	 and	 incompleteness	 of	 events	 is	 the	 norm.	 Empirical	
research	projects	 are	 always	preceded	by	 the	 initial	 construction	of	 concepts	 and	hypotheses	
that	to	a	large	extent	predetermine	what	researchers	will	find.	Perhaps	homicide	statistics	have	
a	modicum	 of	 validity	 and	 reliability	 (Hall	 and	McLean	 2009),	 but	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	make	 this	
claim	about	anything	else	 in	criminology.	Empiricism	might	be	useful	 in	conceptualising	what	
we	 mean	 by	 ‘crime’	 and	 ‘harm’,	 but	 it	 cannot	 help	 us	 to	 reveal	 the	 drives,	 processes	 and	
structures,	 and	 indeed	 their	 very	 real	 consequences,	 which	 exist	 independently	 of	 empirical	
knowledge	and	the	current	theoretical	frameworks	that	are	in	thrall	to	‘empirical	testing’.	In	fact	
we	 might	 suspect	 that	 our	 devotion	 to	 empiricism	 and	 our	 alternative	 devotion	 to	
constructionism	can	be	seen	as	different	but	complementary	ways	of	deliberately	avoiding	any	
contact	with	underlying	drives,	processes	and	structures	(see	Hall	and	Winlow	2015).		
	
However,	 Critical	 Realism	 is	 not	 a	 deterministic	 doctrine.	Most	 critical	 realists	 insist	 that	we	
retain	the	ontological	distinctiveness	of	the	individual	and	the	social	while	we	apply	our	efforts	
to	 the	 analysis	 of	 their	 relatedness.	 The	 standard	 proposition	 is	 ontological	 realism	 in	 the	
intransitive	realm	of	 independent	structures,	processes	and	powers	combined	with	a	qualified	
epistemological	 relativism	 in	 the	 transitive	 realm	 of	 things	 that	 are	 the	 products	 of	 our	
knowledge	and	activity.	We	must	accept	 that	real	power	places	constraints	on	our	knowledge	
and	 activities	 because	 of	 the	 ‘thing‐like’	 quality	 of	 structures,	 processes	 and	 forces	 in	 the	
intransitive	 realm.	 There	 are	 no	 universal	 laws,	 but	 under	 certain	 structural	 and	 processual	
conditions	 there	 are	 probabilistic	 tendencies.	 For	 instance,	 the	 disruption	 of	 settled	
socioeconomic	communities	by	neoliberal	 restructuring	will	 tend	to	 increase	crime,	harm	and	
social	 unrest	 followed	by	 increases	 in	 securitisation.	 Such	 consequences	 are	 to	 a	 large	 extent	
predictable	and	supported	by	historical	analysis.	The	process	 is	of	course	mediated	by	human	
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beings	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 construct	 meaning	 and	 act	 as	 moral	 agents	 in	 the	 world,	 but	 to	
suggest	that	action	is	free	from	either	ideological	or	forceful	restraint	is	naïve.	
	
Nevertheless,	 Critical	 Realism	 focuses	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 agency,	 structure	 and	
causation	in	a	changing	world.	Agency	can	reproduce	structures	and	processes	but	also	has	the	
potential	to	transform	them.	However,	as	we	act	within	them,	they	feed	back	and	influence	what	
we	do.	 Structure	 is	more	 than	an	 ideational	 ‘concept’;	 therefore	we	must	move	beyond	 social	
constructionism	 and	 postmodernism.	 Most	 contemporary	 constructionist	 positions,	 such	 as	
Giddens’s	(1984)	structuration	theory,	are	balanced	between	agency	and	structure,	but	truncate	
and	compress	both	into	the	mid‐range	‘actual’	level	whilst	putting	too	much	faith	in	the	powers	
of	 individual	 agents	 to	 act	 with	 collective	 efficacy.	 Thus	 we	 consistently	 overestimate	 the	
influence	our	ethics,	meanings	and	limited	voluntary	actions	can	exert	on	deep	structural	forces,	
processes	and	structures.		
	
Neoliberalism’s	 market	 logic	 restricts	 us	 as	 long	 as	 we	 remain	 enmeshed	 in	 it	 and	 our	
livelihoods	remain	dependent	upon	it.	We	can	invent	a	humanised	form	of	neoliberalism	in	our	
heads	and	dream	of	alternatives,	but	we	cannot	reduce	 its	 forces,	processes	and	structures	to	
norms,	 rules,	 conventions,	 speech‐acts	 and	 language.	 Firmly	 established	 institutions	 have	 the	
power	 to	 influence	 things	 in	 the	 material	 world:	 think,	 for	 instance,	 of	 the	 probabilistic	
relationships	 between	 neoliberal	 politics,	 globalisation,	 risky	 investment	 banking,	 austerity,	
burgeoning	 criminal	markets,	 social	 unrest	 and	 repressive	 securitisation.	 Critical	Realism	 can	
help	 criminology	 to	 home	 in	 on	 the	 fundamental	 forces,	 processes	 and	 structures	 that	 lie	
underneath	 criminological	 phenomena.	 However,	were	 it	 to	 be	 integrated	 into	 criminological	
theory	and	applied	to	its	full	potential,	it’s	doubtful	that	its	analyses	would	support	the	sort	of	
mid‐range	policy	initiatives	for	which	Matthews	calls.	It	would	be	far	more	likely	to	tell	us	that	
things	run	far	deeper	and	require	correspondingly	deeper	political	intervention.	
	
Critical	Realism	is	also	useful	in	that	it	sees	absence	as	causative.	For	instance,	in	the	absence	of	
a	functioning	welfare	system	and/or	the	politics	of	solidarity	amongst	working	people,	there	is	a	
high	probability	that	criminal	markets	would	expand	and	harmful	crime	would	increase.	Human	
agents	can	of	course	change	their	social	worlds	for	the	better,	as	long	as	they	are	actually	acting	
on	real	underlying	forces,	processes	and	structures	rather	than	simply	gesturing	towards	them.	
Whereas	 positivist‐empiricism	 can	 detect	 only	 the	 symptoms,	 social	 constructionists	 and	
postmodernists	dissolve	 the	 reality	 of	 these	 forces	 in	 language	and	discourse,	while	orthodox	
structural	Marxists	dissolve	 subjectivity	 in	outdated	notions	of	 ideology	as	 the	obfuscation	of	
truth	or	the	hegemonic	‘manufacture	of	consent’.	
	
Critical	realists	assume	that	human	agents	are	relatively	autonomous	but	insist	that	they	must	
understand	 ontology	 before	 they	 understand	 epistemology.	 Idealist	 positions	 such	 as	
interpretivism,	social	constructionism,	discourse	 theory	and	post‐structuralism	are	premature	
and	deal	with	only	one	dimension	of	human	existence.	We	can	talk	but,	with	little	knowledge	of	
the	forces	that	act	beneath	everyday	life,	we	have	little	of	substance	to	talk	about.	By	ignoring	
deep	 forces,	 social	 science	 restricts	 itself	 to	 symptomology	 rather	 than	aetiology	 (Hall	2012a).	
For	 Bhaskar	 (2008a),	 three	 ontological	 dimensions	 of	 social	 reality	 are	 amenable	 to	
epistemology,	agency	and	political	intervention:	
	
1. The	empirical	dimension	(phenomenological	experiences	of	knowing	subjects)	
2. The	actual	dimension	(real	events	and	subjective	experiences)	
3. The	 real	dimension	(underlying	generative	mechanisms	 that	 cause	 the	events	 that	are	
open	to	experience)	
	
This	 depth	 realism	 opens	 up	 an	 intransitive	 dimension	 beneath	 empiricism,	 subjective	
knowledge	and	ethical	 imperatives.	 Increasing	our	knowledge	of	deep	structures	allows	us	 to	
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make	 better	 judgements	 about	 the	 validity	 of	 competing	 knowledge‐claims	 and	 proposed	
political	 interventions.	To	act	effectively	we	need	 to	have	some	 idea	of	what	 lies	beneath	our	
social	conversations,	social	relations	and	subjective	interests,	no	matter	how	complex,	shifting	
and	disturbing	and	daunting	it	might	be.	Critical	Realism’s	objective	is	to	dig	beneath	empirical	
realism	 (positivism	 and	 empiricism),	 transcendental	 idealism	 (hermeneutics,	 interpretivism,	
constructionism)	and	social‐relational	dynamics	(conflict	theory,	Marxism,	feminism)	to	ground	
knowledge	 in	 deep	 structures,	 processes	 and	 generative	 mechanisms.	 It	 is	 not,	 as	 Matthews	
suggests,	simply	to	suggest	pragmatic	policy	suggestions.	
	
However,	Critical	Realism	is	not	deterministic	and	acknowledges	that	causes	must	involve	social	
actions	 performed	 by	 human	 agents,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 aware	 that	 most	 social	 actions	 are	
unconscious,	 routine	 or	 enforced.	 Therefore	 causality	 cannot	 be	 understood	 solely	 by	 the	
analysis	of	actors’	conscious	meanings	as	they	express	them	in	a	language	limited	by	ideology.	
Thus	we	need	to	develop	deeper	and	more	sophisticated	conceptualisations	of	 the	contexts	 in	
which	 human	meanings	 and	 actions	 are	 generated,	 systematised	 and	 reproduced.	 To	 do	 this	
Bhaskar	 steps	 into	 line	with	Giddens	 (1984)	by	 relying	 on	 a	dualistic	model	 of	 structure	 and	
agency	in	which	the	two	categories	are	ontologically	different.	However,	in	his	dialectical	turn,	
Bhaskar	 (2008b)	moves	beyond	Giddens’s	naïve	notion	of	 ‘iterative	practices’	by	arguing	 that	
only	when	agentic	action	is	informed	by	deep	knowledge	of	structures	and	generative	processes	
can	 it	 have	 any	 real	 transformative	potential.	Bhaskar	 uses	 the	 concept	 of	 an	 interdependent	
totality	to	explain	why	human	agents	who	seek	to	transform	the	social	world	must	be	practical	
yet	 simultaneously	 aware	 of	 their	 connectedness	with	 others	 in	 a	 single	 system	 of	 totalising	
relations.	He	agrees	with	Marx	that	an	agent’s	actions	can	become	real,	ethical	and	political	only	
when	they	are	orientated	to	the	practical	activities	that	configure	the	total	system.	As	we	have	
seen,	Matthews’s	uncritical	 acceptance	of	 ‘consumerism’	does	not	 show	 this	 awareness	of	 the	
totality	of	socioeconomic	relations	in	a	global	economy,	or	the	parts	the	consumer	economy	and	
consumer	culture	play	in	the	underlying	generative	mechanisms	important	to	the	criminological	
field	of	enquiry.	
	
As	we	have	seen,	critical	realists	acknowledge	the	fact	that	absence	can	be	transformative;	it	can	
truly	change	the	nature	of	a	thing.	The	human	agent	can	trigger	such	transformative	absence	by	
simply	refusing	to	participate	in	the	totalising	system	of	interdependent	practices,	which	is	the	
principle	 behind	 non‐violent	 resistance	 such	 as	 strikes	 (Žižek	 2008).	 Our	 lives	 could	 be	
positively	 transformed,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 by	 removing,	 say,	 stockpiles	 of	 weapons,	 corrupt	
politicians,	large	corporations	or	the	private	right	to	create	debt‐generated	capital	…	or	even	the	
sociosymbolic	 status	 attached	 to	 luxury	 consumer	 items	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 own	 them.	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 harmful	 transformations	 could	 be	 brought	 about	 by	 removing	 social	 recognition	
and	 nurturing,	 democratic	 politics,	 human	 rights,	 intellectual	 life	 and	 education,	 livelihoods,	
stable	communities,	welfare	support	and	so	on.	However,	not	all	of	this	negative	causation	takes	
place	 in	 the	 mid‐range	 of	 governmental	 policy	 that	 Mathews	 relies	 on;	 much	 of	 it	 runs	 far	
deeper.	
	
However,	it	is	difficult	to	see	the	incorporation	of	Critical	Realism	as	it	stands	into	criminology	
as	a	panacea.	There	are	numerous	flaws,	and	one	of	the	most	important	is	Bhaskar’s	simplified	
view	of	the	‘negative’,	which	does	not	take	into	account	Hegel’s	well‐known	double	negative,	the	
negation	of	the	negation.	Adorno	(1990)	and	Žižek	(1993)	point	out	that	this	important	concept	
provides	us	with	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	transformative	absences	tend	not	to	be	put	into	
practice.	In	the	capitalist	system,	with	 its	totality	of	 interdependent	relations	and	unavoidable	
systemic	imperatives,	imposes	on	its	populations	–	or	at	least	those	with	something	to	lose	–	the	
compulsory	refusal	to	refuse.	 Instead,	when	situations	demand	it,	we	 just	do	things	–	 including	
crime	 and	 harm	 –	 because	 nobody	 seems	willing	 or	 able	 to	make	 the	 sacrifices	 necessary	 to	
make	the	first	moves	towards	an	alternative.	The	system	is	geared	up	to	make	the	political	act	of	
negation	virtually	 impossible	because	 refusal	 to	participate	 in	 some	way	would	be	disastrous	
for	individuals	who	have	no	independent	means	of	support.		
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The	 impossibility	of	using	refusal	and	negation	 to	 invoke	causal	absence	works	on	two	 levels.	
Firstly,	 it	 is	impractical	because	capitalism’s	system	of	interdependencies	is	set	up	make	us	all	
an	offer	we	can’t	 refuse	 if	we	want	to	ensure	our	basic	material	and	social	survival.	Secondly,	
consumer	culture	is	set	up	to	create	a	fantasised	sense	of	absence	and	convert	it	into	desire	for	
consumer	 objects	 that	 carry	 vital	 sociosymbolic	 significance	 for	 individuals	whose	 traditional	
sources	 of	 identity	 are	 receding	 into	 history	 (Hall	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Winlow	 and	 Hall	 2013).	 The	
permanent	 postponement	 of	 the	 power	 of	 negation	 is	 vital	 to	 the	 system’s	 reproduction.	
Speculative	realists	argue	that	in	the	current	Anthropocene	age	many	of	the	deleterious	effects	
that	impact	on	the	world	are	caused	by	us	rather	than	nature.	Therefore,	we	hold	the	power	to	
negate	 these	disasters	 and	become	 the	 architects	 of	 our	 own	 fate	 (Žižek	2010).	 For	 instance,	
criminal	 markets	 would	 not	 burgeon	 so	 rapidly	 in	 the	 developing	 world	 with	 stronger	
democratic	states	and	control	of	resources,	which	are	both	denied	by	neoliberal	financial	power,	
but	 to	 refuse	 the	 demands	 of	 neoliberal	 economic	 restructuring,	 as	 the	 Greek	 case	
demonstrated,	is	almost	impossible.	
	
Many	of	the	changes	in	the	trends	of	crime,	harm	and	securitisation	in	the	twenty‐first	century	
are	 effects	 of	 Anthropocene	 disasters:	 global	 warming	 and	 enforced	 population	 migration,	
resource	wars,	 environmental	 pollution,	 financial	 crashes,	 rapid	 industrialisation	 and	 chaotic	
urbanisation,	 rapid	 deindustrialisation	 and	 urban	 decay,	 unemployment,	 the	 technological	
destruction	of	livelihoods,	the	marketisaton	of	culture	and	so	on.	Speculative	realists	argue	that	
we	must	 look	 upon	 these	 disasters	 and	 their	 consequences	 without	 optimism,	 as	 contingent	
realities	 in	a	cold	world,	but	we	must	also	reflect	 seriously	on	our	role	 in	 their	causation	and	
speculate	freely	on	how	things	could	be	different	should	we	choose	to	change	our	way	of	doing	
things.	Unfortunately	this	is	not	the	sort	of	depth	speculation	that	Matthews’	pragmatic	realism	
would	advocate,	 and	demonstrates	 that	 the	deeper	 and	more	 realistic	 realism	goes,	 the	more	
likely	it	is	to	be	misconceived	by	pragmatists	as	impossible	idealism	or	utopianism.	
	
However,	speculative	realism	shares	a	fundamental	problem	with	the	other	forms	of	realism	we	
have	discussed	so	 far;	 their	separation	of	agency	 from	structure	means	 they	have	 little	 to	say	
about	 subjectivity’s	 active	 and	willing	 role	 in	 disasters	 and	 their	 consequences.	 They	 cannot	
explain	why	subjects	seem	unable	to	learn	from	their	mistakes	and	willing	to	risk	the	infliction	
of	 harm	 on	 others	 and	 their	 environments	 in	 order	 to	 reproduce	 the	 current	 socioeconomic	
system	and	 further	 their	 interests	within	 it.	 In	 the	act	of	separating	out	and	absolving	human	
beings,	 Critical	Realism’s	dualism	of	 agency	 and	 structure	 to	 some	 extent	 still	 reifies	 abstract	
forces	and	exonerates	the	individual.	Žižek	(passim)	provides	us	with	a	more	illuminating	view	
of	 the	 subject’s	 relation	 to	 the	 capitalist	 socioeconomic	 system.	He	 reminds	us	 rather	harshly	
that	we	are	already	aware	of	the	intransitive	realm	and	know	enough	about	it	to	act	politically,	
and	 we	 consistently	 encounter	 realistic	 speculation	 about	 the	 problems	 we	 cause	 and	
alternative	 ways	 of	 doing	 things.	 But	 we	 repress	 this	 true	 knowledge	 and	 sink	 back	 into	 a	
culture	of	comfortable	acceptance.	We	systematically	avoid	Hegel’s	politically	effective	universal	
truth,	the	concrete	universal,	which	could	provide	real	substance	to	our	speculative	knowledge	
(Žižek	 2000).	 The	 concrete	 universal	 truth	 is	 known	 to	 some	 extent	 by	 most	 of	 us,	 but	
particularly	 well	 by	 those	 pushed	 into	 abject	 positions	 in	 capitalism’s	 social	 constellation	
because	they	experience	it	every	day.	Myriad	concrete	universal	representations	of	the	totality	
exist	‘down	there’	amongst	those	who	regularly	experience	the	deleterious	consequences	of	the	
system’s	disasters	(see	Hall	and	Winlow	2015).	 ‘Up	 there’,	 the	corridors	of	power	 in	business	
and	 post‐political	 administration	 are	 shot	 through	with	 knowledge	 of	 abstract	 processes	and	
their	related	concrete	universals.	For	 instance,	 in	 JQ	Wilson’s	Thinking	About	Crime	 (1975)	he	
revealed	 that	 at	 the	 time	 the	 US	 government	 knew	 perfectly	 well	 that	 the	 impending	
restructuring	of	 the	 economy	 in	 the	 abrupt	move	 to	neoliberalism	would	 cause	 social	 unrest,	
increased	crime	rates	and	the	popular	perception	of	the	need	for	increased	securitisation.	
	
Harmful	 crime,	 violence,	 intimidation,	 victimhood,	 cynicism,	 nihilism	 and	 the	 destruction	 of	
communities	 are	 some	 of	 the	 substantive	 criminological	 elements	 of	 the	 abject	 concrete	
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universal	 that	 is	 vital	 to	 a	 renewed	 realist	 criminological	 research	 project.	We	must	 concern	
ourselves	with	the	individuals	who	suffer	most	in	the	wake	of	capitalism’s	disasters,	the	victims	
of	its	corporate	and	political	crimes	but	also	of	the	crimes	of	the	cynical	predatory	individuals	
who	live	amongst	them	and	take	advantage	of	their	subjugation	and	vulnerability.	To	bring	the	
concrete	 universal	 into	 sharper	 relief,	 we	 suggest	 a	move	 to	 an	ultra‐realist	 criminology	 that	
uses	unsentimental	ethnographies	contextualised	by	advanced	theoretical	frameworks	founded	
upon	conceptions	of	subjectivity	and	ideology	provided	by	new	continental	philosophy	(see	Hall	
and	 Winlow	 2015).	 Ultra‐realist	 criminology	 would	 move	 beyond	 Left	 Realism’s	 inherent	
pragmatism	and	Critical	Realism’s	flawed	conception	of	subjectivity.	As	a	first	step	towards	the	
construction	 of	 a	 philosophical	 basis	 for	 ultra‐realist	 criminology,	 we	 have	 to	 accept	 that	
Bhaskar’s	 naturalistic	 metaphor	 for	 subjectivity	 does	 not	 work.	 There	 is	 no	 natural	 human	
essence	 of	 love	 and	 creativity	 but,	 as	 Fromm	 (1956)	 reminded	 us,	 it	 can	 be	 cultivated	 in	 a	
nurturing	society.	For	Lacan	and	Žižek,	 the	 ‘essence’	of	human	subjectivity	 is,	paradoxically,	a	
non‐essential	void	of	conflicting	drives,	not	a	natural	and	 inexhaustible	Bergsonian	 ‘élan	vital’	
(see	Hall	2012b).	Our	potential	to	be	loving	and	creative	is	always	offset	by	an	equal	potential	to	
be	hateful,	prejudiced,	apathetic	or	nihilistic.	The	material	core	of	the	human	being	is	anxious,	
contingent	and	flexible,	far	more	complex	and	unpredictable	–	and	certainly	more	susceptible	to	
obscene	enjoyment	–	than	any	naturalistic	or	transcendental	idealist	metaphor	can	represent.		
	
Roberts	and	Joseph	(2005)	argue	that	Bhaskar’s	real	dimension	is	fully	human,	not	independent	
of	 the	 subject.	 For	 Žižek,	 what	 connects	 the	 subject	 to	 the	 real	 is	 an	 ideological	 fantasy	
comprised	 of	 sublime	 consumer	 objects,	 which	 again	 indicates	 just	 how	 much	 Matthews’	
dismissal	 of	 advanced	 capitalism’s	 prominent	 cultural	 form	 hampers	 the	 move	 to	 realist	
criminological	 investigation.	 These	 objects	 are	 variations	 of	 the	 master	 signifier	 of	 the	
commodity,	 which	 constitutes	 the	 dynamic	 relation	 between	 subjectivity	 and	 capitalism’s	
system	of	relentless	commodification	and	competitive	individualism.	Where	Matthews’	mistake	
is	to	ignore	consumer	culture	and	subjectivity	entirely,	Critical	Realism’s	mistake	is	to	single	out	
subjectivity	as	the	naturally	ethical	and	creative	agent.	Žižek’s	(2008)	useful	insight	is	that	the	
social	and	economic	processes	 in	the	 intransitive	realm	that	seem	to	act	 independently	of	our	
knowledge	 and	 activity	 are	 at	 the	 very	 deepest	 level	 a	 product	 of	 historically	 accumulated	
actions	that	are	routinely	made	unconscious.	We	really	know	about	what	we	have	done,	what	we	
are	doing	and	–	as	JQ	Wilson’s	example	above	shows	–	what	we	are	about	to	do.	In	other	words,	
we	know	a	 lot	about	 the	 intransitive	realm	and	we	have	done	so	 for	some	 time.	Each	day	we	
consciously	act	to	reproduce	it,	but	we	fetishistically	deny	our	collusion	in	our	own	actions	and	
repress	it	into	our	unconscious.	Therefore	the	unconscious,	the	deep	psychic	realm	of	repressed	
symbols,	 is	not	created	by	external	 repressive	 forces	 imposed	on	us	 from	above.	We	create	 it	
ourselves	by	constantly	choosing	to	repress	specific	aspects	of	what	we	know,	which	allows	us	to	
continue	to	act	in	ways	that	reproduce	the	system;	we	persistently	choose	our	own	unconscious	
into	 being.	 Constantly	 deconstructing	 ‘meaning’	 is	 of	 little	 use	 when	 each	 day	 we	 choose	 to	
fetishistically	disavow	and	render	unconscious	the	crucial	elements	of	what	we	already	know.		
	
The	 constant	 act	 of	 fetishistic	 disavowal	 that	 characterises	 the	 agent’s	 inability	 to	 act	 and	 its	
tendency	 to	 either	 passively	 accept	 or	 actively	 conform	 to	 the	 aggressive	 and	 competitive	
practices	 that	 reproduce	 the	 system	 and	 inflict	 harm	 on	 others	 has	 huge	 implications	 for	
criminological	 research	 and	 theory.	 Unforgiving	 interpersonal	 competition,	 inequality,	
separatism,	 racism,	 sexism,	 fraud,	 corruption,	 violence,	 securitisation	 and	 punitiveness	 are	
merely	some	of	the	crude	visible	symptoms	that	lie	on	the	surface	of	the	complex	of	underlying	
forces	 activated	 by	 the	 system’s	 constant	 provocation	 of	 the	 subject’s	 anxiety	 and	 obscene	
enjoyment.	 Matthews	 is	 unerringly	 right	 in	 recognising	 that	 we	 need	 to	 move	 beyond	 both	
critical	criminology	and	administrative	criminology.	However,	his	truncated	mid‐range	form	of	
realism‐as‐pragmatism	cannot	escape	the	problems	inherent	in	empiricism,	liberal	assumptions	
of	 subjectivity	 and	 consumer	 culture’s	 capture	 of	 human	 energy	 and	 desire,	 which	 endlessly	
distracts	 individuals	 and	 postpones	 vital	 political	 interventions.	 For	 criminology	 to	 begin	 its	
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investigation	 of	 the	 forces	 and	 processes	 that	 underlie	 life	 in	 advanced	 capitalism	 requires	 a	
move	beyond	both	Left	Realism	and	Critical	Realism	to	Ultra‐Realism.		
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